CAB148-30-Defence and Oversea Policy Committee Meetings Relating to 1967 Disturbances-1967 — Page 68

SECRET

Page 68

(97792)

On our

detailed discussions on this aspect would not be between Governments but between the Ministry of Defence as employers and (as regards civilian employees) the unions; the Maltese were anxious that these discussions should take place at the same time as the principal negotiations. side, we should stross in the negotiations our desire to work with the Maltese in creating new opportunities of employment and we should seek to

persuade the Maltese that their assessment of the employment consequences

of our run-down was over pessimistic. Should the talks show signs of foundering we should not hesitate to point out to the Maltese that if no

agreement could be reached we should withdraw all our forces and, while we

would not necessarily terminate all economic aid, there could be no

guarantee of its continuance on the present scale.

In general discussion, concern was expressed at the possibility of our

being induced to offer the Maltese yet further concessions which would be

costly not only in financial terms but also in terms of our defence

redeployment. Already we had offered concessions which would mean that we

should fall considerably short of the whole of the savings for which we had

originally hoped. An extension of the defence run-down into the fifth year

would further diminish the expected defence savings; we should concentrate the discussions on rephasing within the present planned four-year period, offering as little as possible in respect of an extension into the fifth year,

Otherwise there was a risk of our ending the dispute with Malta by obtaining

little saving and the maximum of opprobrium. It was also important that we

should not allow the negotiations to drag on, but should aim at concluding

them within, say, one week.

made

In discussion of particular items the following additional points were

(a) Defence run-down. The extension of the run-down into the fifth year

would involve retaining one of the two infantry battalions in Malta, at a cost which was estimated at £14 million for a full year.

The

However, the further retention of an infantry battalion in Malta should not

be considered in isolation from the other measures of rephasing listed in the report by officials. There were many permutations, which varied in cost, in

the resulting rate of redundancy, and in their military implications.

proposals described in the report by officials offered an even spread of

redundancy over the four-year period, and were the least disadvantageous

militarily: their cost was a little over £4 million. It would be possible

to devise a rephasing which extended into the fifth year at no greater perhaps even lesser cost; conversely a rephasing that pushed all the redundancy back into the fourth year but offered no extension int the fifth

year would be substantially nore expensive. Our aim should be to offer

concessions in respect of the defence run-d wn only a little at a time.

Page 68

4- SECRET

Z

or

Page 68

મ